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Who Punishes the Leader?
Leader Culpability and Coups during Civil War
Who punishes leaders via coups during civil war? By distinguishing between different types
of internal audiences within the government and their attempts to remove a leader forcefully, I
illuminate the mechanisms that explain variation in who punishes the leader during wartime. I
claim that whether leaders are culpable for the initiation of the war has an important implica-
tion for whether they are punished by members of the ruling coalition (i.e., those with access to
decision-making and political power), or by those outside the ruling coalition. Empirical evi-
dence supports my hypotheses: (i) culpable leaders are more likely to experience coup attempts
led by those outside the leaders’ ruling coalition, should the war go poorly; and (ii) nonculpa-
ble leaders are more likely to experience coups executed by members of their ruling coalition.
The findings have important implications for how leaders respond to audience pressures as they
consider whether to fight or settle.
This is a peer-reviewed, accepted author manuscript of the following article:
Sudduth, J. (Accepted/In press). Who punishes the leader? Leader culpability and
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Introduction
Who punishes leaders via coups during civil war? State leaders face dual threats to their po-
litical power during civil war. They face threats not only from rebels outside the regime, but
also from within the regime. As the military is the institution of violence capable of defeating
rebellions, leaders need to invest enough resources in strengthening their militaries, and yet
if they do so they confront the problem that these stronger military institutions will be better
able to overthrow them (e.g. Huntington, 1957; Feaver, 1999; Svolik, 2012; Acemoglu, Ticchi
and Vindigni, 2010).1 How leaders cope with coup threats when they confront threats coming
from outside the regime has been a long-standing theme in studies of civil-military relations
(e.g. Desch, 1999; McMahon and Slantchev, 2015). Indeed, empirical evidence shows that the
likelihood of coup attempts increases by about 82 percent during an ongoing civil war, relative
to peace-time, and, globally, nearly one in four of the coups attempted since 1950 occurred
in the context of civil war (Bell and Sudduth, 2017). Leaders are also vulnerable to coup
risks immediately after a civil war (White, 2019). Though existing research has highlighted
an increased threat of coups during civil war and improved our understanding of the linkages
between coups and civil war (e.g. Roessler, 2016; Aksoy, Carter and Wright, 2015; Powell,
2015; Thyne, 2015), we know very little about the variations within wartime coups. More gen-
erally, though the notion that variations in the anticipation of punishment in the form of losing
office shape state leaders’ wartime decisions underpins many prominent theories of both civil
war (Prorok, 2016a,b) and interstate war (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Chiozza and
Goemans., 2004), we know very little about leader punishment during ongoing wars.
In this article, I propose a theoretical mechanism that explains the variations in who
punishes wartime leaders via coups, by introducing a new distinction between different types of
internal audiences (i.e., individuals and groups within the state apparatus).2 I explain why some
wartime leaders experience coup attempts led by members of the leaders’ ruling coalition with
1For the literature on linkages between coups and civil war, see Sudduth (2016).
2Hereafter I use the term leader punishment to refer to internal audiences’ attempts to re-
move leaders via coups forcefully.
1
access to the decision-making body and political power of the regime (i.e., coalition insiders),
while others are challenged by those outside the ruling coalition (i.e., coalition outsiders).
Sierra Leone, for example, experienced wartime coups both in 1992 and in 1996 during the
war with the Revolutionary United Front. Though these coups occurred only a few years apart
during the same war, the types of plotters greatly differed. The 1992 coup was led by a group
of young junior officers and soldiers, while the 1996 coup was led by a group of high-ranking
members of the military junta, including the Chief of Defense Staff. My proposed theory can
explain such variations. Focusing on the question of who punishes leaders is important because
the types of new leaders, rather than a leader change itself, matter in predicting how the new
leaders make decisions on whether to continue a costly war or settle (e.g. Prorok, 2016a). As I
discuss further below, my findings have important implications for the process and outcome of
civil war. Moreover, as a growing body of coup literature demonstrates, coups led by different
types of plotters are fundamentally different in terms of their causes and consequences (e.g.
Albrecht and Eibl, 2018; Aksoy, Carter and Wright, 2015; Bruin, 2019). Lumping together
these different types of coups would prevent us from fully understanding the causal mechanism
behind wartime coups as well as their impacts on the trajectory of civil war.
My central claim is that whether leaders are considered culpable for the initiation of or
involvement in the war is the key determinant in why some wartime leaders experience coup
attempts led by those inside the ruling coalition (e.g., elite officers who have positions in the
ruling body of the military junta, or civilian elites who have key positions such as cabinet mem-
berships), whereas others are challenged by coalition outsiders (e.g., middle- and low-ranked
officers). When leaders are culpable for involvement in the war because they were in power at
the conflict’s start, or because they had political connections to the culpable predecessors, I ar-
gue that they are more likely to experience coups led by coalition outsiders should they perform
poorly.3 As coalition outsiders such as middle- and low-ranked officers are the ones to fight
rebels on the battlefield, they have strong incentives to remove incompetent leaders who they
3This definition of culpability is consistent with the literature (e.g., Croco, 2011; Prorok,
2016a).
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think have mismanaged the war. On the other hand, coalition insiders would hesitate to replace
culpable leaders, because their political connections to the leaders and their decisions to fight
make them viewed as culpable, and the costs of inheriting culpability are too high when the war
is going poorly. Second, when leaders are not culpable for the initiation of the war, I expect that
the leaders are more likely to be punished by coalition insiders. Nonculpable leaders’ willing-
ness to pursue a negotiated settlement with rebels would cause disagreements among members
of the ruling coalition regarding specific procedures and outcomes of the negotiations. The
members of the ruling coalition who currently enjoy privileged access to political power have
a greater capability than coalition outsiders to organize a coup and are more sensitive to the
outcomes of the negotiation process. Coalition insiders thus are more likely to lead a coup
against nonculpable leaders. The empirical results using a newly coded dataset of wartime
coup attempts provide strong evidence for my hypotheses: (i) culpable leaders are more likely
to experience coups led by those outside the leaders’ ruling coalition, should the war go poorly,
while (ii) nonculpable leaders are more likely to face coup attempts led by members of their
ruling coalition.
This paper offers important contributions to several literatures. First, by focusing on
the question of who punishes wartime leaders, this article improves our understanding of the
civil war process and outcomes. Crucially, this article’s finding suggests that the regime has a
self-sufficient mechanism to remove culpable leaders who have incentives to continue a costly
war and put nonculpable leaders in power who have no such incentives. At the same time,
however, my findings reveal that nonculpable leaders’ initiatives to terminate the war through
negotiations are not punishment-free, challenging the literature’s view (e.g. Prorok, 2016a).
Culpability impacts who punishes leaders, but not the likelihood of punishment itself. Second,
this paper is the first to analyze leader punishment during ongoing war systematically. Despite
the central role that leader accountability plays in studies of war and political violence, we
know very little about when and how leaders are held accountable during wartime. Though
some researchers have examined whether leaders are punished in the context of interstate war
(e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Chiozza and Goemans., 2004; Croco and Weeks,
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2016), their analyses primarily focus on how leaders fare in the aftermath of a war. Yet, under-
standing the mechanisms behind wartime punishment is important, because leaders’ decision
calculus during wartime should depend not only on the expected likelihood of post-war pun-
ishment but also on the anticipation of wartime punishment.
This article proceeds as follows. First, it defines key concepts and briefly examines
existing research on coups and leader punishment during civil war. Second, I develop a theory
on how leader culpability affects who punishes the leader. Third, I provide information on
the data and models, and discuss the empirical results. Finally, I conclude by examining the
article’s implications.
Coups and Leader Punishment during Civil War
This article studies internal audiences’ attempts to forcefully remove a state leader, which I
will refer to as coups, during civil war. Internal audiences are defined here as “individuals
and groups within the government who can coordinate to hold leaders accountable”(Prorok,
2016b, p5). Though leaders are held accountable in various manners (Sudduth and Bell, 2018),
I focus on nonconstitutional leader removals because, as Svolik (2012, p4) emphasizes, leader
punishment in these cases “most plausibly occurred nonconsensually– against the will of the
incumbent leader.” Moreover, the principal threat most wartime leaders face stems from inter-
nal audiences, including the military. Existing research shows that political leaders are more
likely to experience coups during an ongoing civil war (Bell and Sudduth, 2017) as well as
immediately after the war (White, 2019). Furthermore, the consequences of coups are severe.
Coup attempts often result in the imprisonment, death, or exile of the former leader (Goemans,
2008) as well as more general violence with a significant number of deaths (Bruin, 2019), and
are known to have long-term effects on a country’s political stability and economy even in the
case of failed coups (Harkness, 2018; Roessler, 2016; Powell and Chacha, 2016).
What explains the variation in leader punishment inflicted by internal audiences during
civil war? Existing research maintains that whether leaders are perceived as responsible for
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the initiation of war has an important consequence for leader punishment (Prorok, 2016a,b).
Culpable leaders, who have clear ties to the decisions to initiate the war either by (1) being in
power at the conflict’s start (first leaders), or (2) coming to power during the war and having
political connections to the decision to fight (replacement culpable leaders), will face a high
risk of punishment if they accept any outcome less than a victory. In contrast, nonculpable
leaders face little risk of punishment even in the case of defeat because internal audiences will
be more forgiving of leaders whom they perceive to be unconnected to the choice to initiate the
war (Croco, 2011; Croco and Weeks, 2016).
The logic behind this argument is that the leader’s connection to the original decision to
go to war shapes the internal audiences’ assessment of leader competence. Internal audiences
are more likely to label culpable leaders “incompetent” when wars go poorly, because they
are deemed to lack sound judgment in decision making since they started a war which has
been difficult to win, or they could not prevent opposition groups from starting the war (Croco,
2011). Not only first leaders who directly preside over the transition from peace to war, but
those replacement leaders who share political and familial connections with the first leader are
also considered incompetent in the case of poor war outcomes because such connections imply
their knowledge of and influence over the decision-making process that led to war (Prorok,
2016b, p6). On the other hand, nonculpable leaders who come to power during war and share
no ties with the first leader can dodge the accusations of poor judgment and mismanagement
by distancing themselves from the original decision to go to war.
Though the literature has greatly improved our understanding of wartime accountability,
it does not illuminate who – which parts of internal audiences – will punish leaders. This is an
important issue because if a leader’s culpability has a decisive impact on the trajectory of a civil
war and the culpability itself transfers from one leader to others who are politically connected
to the decision to fight, who will attempt to replace a culpable leader during the war will also
have an important implication for the outcome of the war. Second, scholarship has focused on a
leader’s competence in executing a war as the criterion by which internal audiences evaluate the
leader. Though removing incompetent leaders from office certainly captures an essential aspect
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of wartime punishment, the exclusive focus on competence can obscure other important reasons
why internal audiences might punish wartime leaders. By ignoring other reasons why internal
audiences would punish leaders, the existing literature might underestimate the likelihood of
punishment for nonculpable leaders. In the following sections, I explain a causal mechanism
that accounts for who punishes wartime leaders by focusing on leaders’ culpability.
Theory
There are two types of internal audiences that might forcefully remove leaders. The first group
are members of the ruling coalition who have influence over policy decisions within the regime
and access to political power (i.e., coalition insiders), and the second type are those individuals
who are outside the ruling coalition and so have no access to the decision-making process
nor substantive political power (i.e., coalition outsiders). For instance, high-ranking military
officers who are members of the ruling body of military juntas, members of royal families
in monarchy systems, and members of the politburo and the central committee of the ruling
party are ruling elites who control the decision-making process and have privileged access to
political power in these regimes. Individuals who hold cabinet positions or key governmental
positions are also considered coalition insiders in many authoritarian countries. When political
power is highly concentrated around a single individual (i.e., personalist regimes), the decision-
making process is limited to the dictator and his very small inner circle (e.g. Svolik, 2009).
For democracies, I consider individuals who have cabinet positions, high-ranking government
positions, and memberships in the incumbent leader’s party as coalition insiders because of
their knowledge of and influence over the decision-making process. Coalition outsiders, on the
other hand, are typically middle- or lower-ranked military officers who do not have access to
the key decision-making body or political power.4
4As Albrecht and Eibl (2018, p.2) point out, the defining criterion of coalition insiders is
whether an individual has access to the political decision-making body and political power,
rather than an officer’s specific rank in the military hierarchy. Thus, individual higher-ranking
officers can be categorized as coalition outsiders if they have no access to the decision-making
process. The coding process is discussed in greater detail in the empirical section and the
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Culpable Leader and Punishment
When culpable leaders perform poorly in a war, I expect that they will face a higher likelihood
of coups inflicted by coalition outsiders, but not by coalition insiders. Coalition outsiders
have strong incentives to remove culpable leaders for two reasons. First, they want to improve
performance in the war by replacing an incompetent leader who has mismanaged the war with
a more competent leader. Internal audiences assess leader competence using information on
battlefield performances and leader culpability. Because they started a war that was difficult to
win, or because they could not prevent opposition groups from starting a costly war, culpable
leaders will be increasingly seen as incompetent as the war goes poorly.5 Middle- and lower-
ranked officers and soldiers are the ones who fight rebel groups on the battlefield and suffer
most from the increased costs of the war and the leader’s mishandling of the war. Keeping
an incompetent leader in power a little longer will greatly increase the chance of the military
officers themselves being killed on the battlefield. As their physical survival is on the line,
those middle- and lower-ranked officers and soldiers have no time to be forgiving of a culpable
leader who performs poorly in the war.
As an example, consider the 1992 Sierra Leonean coup. In March 1991, Sierra Leone,
under Joseph Momoh’s one-party government was plunged into civil war when it was invaded
by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The RUF immediately took control of large swathes
of territory in eastern and southern Sierra Leone, while the government side could not ef-
fectively fight back, as the army did not have sufficient weapons, communication equipment,
ground transportation, nor air strike capability. Further, culpable leader Momoh did not prop-
erly provide soldiers with training and salaries, which resulted in low morale and poor perfor-
mance (Mutwol, 2008). After witnessing such battlefield situations firsthand, Captain Valentine
Strasser and other disgruntled junior officers organized a coup, deposed President Momoh in
Appendix.
5As a variety of factors that are beyond the leader’s control shapes a war trajectory, internal
audiences cannot base their judgment of leader competence solely on battlefield performances.
Instead, they use an additional source of information – whether a leader is culpable for the war
initiation – to distinguish competent from incompetent leaders (Prorok, 2016a, p.73-74).
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April 1992, and established a military junta to improve battlefield performance.
Second, coalition outsiders will attempt to remove culpable leaders so that they can end
a costly or losing war. Culpable leaders have strong incentives to continue fighting in the
face of hardship and “gamble for resurrection” even when the costs of war are high, and the
victory is unlikely. Culpability makes compromise costly, as adopting a conciliatory strategy
involves reneging on promises made at the war’s start, and thus internal audiences will judge
them incompetent when they settle for anything less than a victory. Continuing a war provides
the opportunity to turn the tide and forestall punishment while terminating a war by settling
on compromise terms leads to certain punishment for culpable leaders. Military officers and
soldiers deployed to the war zones are most vulnerable to leaders’ strategies to gamble for
resurrection and thus have strong incentives to remove culpable leaders to end the war.6 Though
some culpable leaders might participate in a peace process with rebels, their incentives to avoid
compromise make it very difficult for the negotiating parties to make progress and commit to
terminate the war. Moreover, some culpable leaders might feign an interest in a peace process
so that they can have time to regroup and gain a stronger military position (Beardsley, 2018,
pp.318-319). Thus, even when the peace process starts, coalition outsiders still have incentives
to replace a leader with someone who could commit to ending the war. Crucially, coalition
outsiders, who by definition have no access to the regime’s decision-making body, can distance
themselves from the leader’s decision to go to war. The lack of political connections to their
culpable predecessors allows coalition outsiders to escape from the “incompetent” designation
even when they end the war by settling for less than a victory.
The above reasoning, however, does not apply to members of the culpable leader’s ruling
coalition. Coalition insiders who would be seen as politically connected to the decision to
fight would hesitate to replace their leader, as the costs of inheriting culpability are too high
when the war is going poorly. Culpability transfers from first leaders to replacement leaders
6It is certainly possible that some culpable leaders want to terminate a war but cannot do
so because of various factors beyond their control. My claim is, though, that regardless of
the actual type or intention of leaders, internal audiences will perceive a prolonged war as a
consequence of the leader’s intentional choice when a leader is culpable.
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when the latter have political or familial connections with the former, and thus are viewed
as having knowledge of and influence over the decision-making that led to war (e.g. Croco,
2011). Coalition insiders of culpable leaders would thus inherit culpability should they replace
the leaders. Members of the first leader’s ruling coalition will be viewed as culpable precisely
because they were in positions that could directly influence the first leaders’ decisions to start
a war.7 Members of replacement culpable leaders’ ruling coalitions would also be viewed as
politically connected to the first leader’s decisions to fight. The transition from first leaders to
replacement culpable leaders is achieved by reshuffling leaders but keeping intact the group of
ruling elites with power to influence decisions (Aksoy, Carter and Wright, 2015).
The costs of inheriting culpability are high for coalition insiders when the war is going
poorly. Replacement culpable leaders will face a high risk of punishment if they terminate
the war for anything less than victory. Though members of the ruling elite might want to
replace an incumbent culpable leader in the hope of improving prospects for success in the
war, the likelihood of turning the tide and achieving victory at this point might be minimal.
In the event of defeat or settlement with concessions, leaders deemed culpable for the war
face a heightened risk of punishment by internal audiences. They will also face punishment
by opponents and international organizations such as the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Recognizing that culpable leaders are unable to commit to ending the war, rebels will have
strong incentives to remove them from power in the hope that a nonculpable leader takes over
who can commit to ending the war or implementing peace agreements. The ICC also targets
heads of state who are culpable for atrocity crimes during civil war (Krcmaric, 2018). Of
course, coalition insiders may face post-war punishment even if they do not replace a culpable
predecessor. However, taking the position of the head of state will significantly increase both
the magnitude and the chances of punishment. While members of the ruling coalition could
potentially distance themselves from their leader and attribute poor war outcomes to the leader’s
choice of tactics, once they take the position of a state leader, they will face, with certainty,
7As I explain in the empirical section, Insider Coup is coded for culpable leaders only when
key plotters were politically connected to first leaders at the war’s start.
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punishment in the case of poor war outcomes. Given that the costs of inheriting culpability are
too high, coalition insiders have no incentives to replace culpable leaders when the war is going
badly.
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: When a culpable leader performs poorly in a civil war, s/he is more
likely to experience a coup led by coalition outsiders during the war.
Nonculpable Leader and Punishment
When leaders are not culpable, sharing no political ties with the first leader and no influence
over the decision-making process that led to war, they lack incentives to continue fighting a
costly and losing war. Even if they terminate a war short of victory, nonculpable leaders can
avoid blame for the outcome, and internal audiences are more forgiving of leaders whom they
perceive to be unconnected to the choice to start the war. If, on the other hand, nonculpable
leaders decide to continue a costly war, they need to invest additional resources in the war
that they could instead allocate to other important policy agendas. Given the risk of ultimately
losing the war, continuing to pour resources into the war is not a good strategy for nonculpable
leaders (Croco, 2011, p462). Therefore, if the war goes poorly, these leaders will increasingly
pursue the peace process with rebels and termination through settlement.
Nonculpable leaders’ incentives to pursue a negotiated settlement, however, would lead
to conflict between the leaders and their internal audiences regarding specific procedures and
outcomes of the negotiations. As the costs of war increase, nonculpable leaders will have
stronger incentives to terminate the war and thus will be more willing to make substantial con-
cessions that will satisfy rebels. Concessions to end costly civil wars typically entail the expan-
sion of political, economic, and military power for rebel groups in the post-war environment
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(Joshi and Quinn, 2017, pg.20-21).8 Power-sharing arrangements allow the former rebels to
have access to the state resources through membership of the cabinet or military organizations,
or the formation of political parties. They also redefine the distribution of economic resources
controlled by the state (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). The power-sharing arrangements thus will
diminish the power of members of internal audiences.
Crucially, though, how each individual member of the audiences will be impacted by the
settlement depends on the exact designs and the details of negotiated outcomes. For example,
which aspects of state power and resources will be shared by rebels, or the timing and sequenc-
ing of the implementation of negotiated provisions, will shape the post-war power dynamics
(Joshi and Quinn, 2017). When internal audiences find that nonculpable leaders do not repre-
sent their interests in the negotiation process and will diminish their post-war power, they will
attempt to overthrow the leaders hoping that a new leader would bring them a better negotiation
outcome. For example, a civilian leader might be more willing to agree on the rebel-military
integration than military members of the ruling elite whose post-war power would be consider-
ably compromised under such military power-sharing arrangements (White, 2019). In this case,
the audiences would try to overthrow the leader whose preference is divergent from theirs.9
As the costs of continuing to fight increase, a nonculpable leader becomes more willing to
make sufficient and substantial concessions to rebels so that she can terminate the war. This, in
turn, leads to disagreements between the leader and internal audiences over the exact nature of
concessions and negotiation outcomes. The audiences would try to oust the leader and replace
her with a new leader who could better represent their interests in the negotiation processes and
achieve a better negotiation outcome.
I claim that punishment of a nonculpable leader resulting from the disagreement over
the peace process will be inflicted by coalition insiders, not outsiders. First, the process and
outcomes of the peace settlement would most affect high-ranked officers and top elites who
8According to Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, p.319), of the 38 negotiated settlements of civil
wars between 1945 and 1998, 37 peace agreements included power-sharing provisions.
9Alternatively, the audiences might suspect that the leader is making unnecessary compro-
mises due to her incompetency. They then would want to replace the leader with someone who
has stronger negotiation skills and would be able to bring a better negotiation outcome.
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hold the regime’s key positions and thus currently enjoy exclusive access to political power.
As Albrecht and Eibl (2018) explain, members of the ruling coalition attempt a coup primarily
when their position within the elite coalition is threatened by a power shift within the regime.
Given the high stakes of losing their power, members of the ruling coalitions want to impose
their preferences on the process and outcomes of the peace negotiation so that they maximize
their share of state power in the post-war environment. When they anticipate that nonculpable
leaders will promote settlement deals with rebels that could substantially diminish their share of
power, they will attempt to prevent it from happening by removing the leaders. In comparison,
those outside the ruling coalition, such as middle- or lower-ranked officers, have less of a
stake in the negotiation process precisely because they do not have access to political power
in the current system. Albrecht and Eibl (2018) maintain that middle- or lower-ranked officers
primarily look at military service as a job that provides them with a regular income. Therefore,
their concerns are primarily about their own salaries and the provision of suitable equipment
and infrastructure, rather than their share of political power.
Second, and more fundamentally, coalition insiders have a greater capacity to organize a
coup than coalition outsiders. Coalition insiders have better access to key facilities and infor-
mation about the regime or the inclinations of fellow officers, which are crucial to the successful
execution of a coup. They also have more experience in planning and executing complex mil-
itary operations and, thus, have a greater capacity to develop plans to launch a coup (Bruin,
2019, p.5-6). Therefore, if the military as an organization disagrees with the directions pursued
by a political leader and is concerned about the military’s shares of power in the post-war ar-
rangement, elite officers who have a greater coup-making capacity will lead a coup (Thompson,
1976; Aksoy, Carter and Wright, 2015). For instance, leaders’ concessions to increase rebels’
power by integrating rebel forces into the military will directly affect coalition outsiders’ job
security. Crucially, though, precisely because their preferences are aligned with those of the
ruling elites, coalition outsiders need not to take independent actions by plotting a coup in these
circumstances. This scenario is in stark contrast to when leaders are culpable. As I maintained
above, coalition insiders would hesitate to replace culpable leaders as the costs of inheriting
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culpability is too high when the war is going poorly. Coalition outsiders’ interests to oust
culpable leaders will not be represented by coalition insiders.
To illustrate the above logic, consider the dynamics behind the coup removal of Sierra
Leone’s Valentine Strasser. As it became clear that defeating rebels of the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) was difficult and the cost of the war had increased, nonculpable Strasser and the
NPRC started the process of making peace with the RUF. In this context, Brigadier General
Julius Maada Bio, who was a deputy to Strasser and the chief of defense staff, ousted Strasser
in January 1996 due to their disagreement about the handling of the peace process, such as the
sequences of the peace negotiations with the RUF and the election that would allow a transi-
tion to a democratically elected civilian government (Captain Strasser Is Ousted From Office,
N.d.). The coup was supported by many high-ranked NPRC members, including Colonel Tom
Nyuma, Lieutenant Colonel Komba Mondeh, and Lieutenant Colonel Reginald Glover, who
had helped Strasser gain power (Mutwol, 2008, p.232). It is important to emphasize that non-
culpable Strasser was not punished because he decided to settle with rebels short of victory.
Plotters punished Strasser because they suspected that the way Strasser handled the peace nego-
tiation would have significantly weakened their positions in the post-war setting and wanted to
take control of the negotiation process. Indeed, immediately after he took power, Bio restarted
peace negotiations with the RUF (Mutwol, 2008, p.232).
Hypothesis 2: When a nonculpable leader performs poorly in a civil war, s/he is
more likely to experience a coup led by coalition insiders during the war.
We can think of some alternative mechanisms that might potentially challenge my expla-
nations. First, the entry manner of leaders, rather than leader culpability, might explain the type
of coups during civil war. According to my theory, culpable leaders tend to experience outsider
coups that would put in power nonculpable leaders who lack political connections with the first
leaders. This logic might imply that nonculpable leaders tend to come to power via a coup,
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as in the case of Sierra Leone’s Strasser. A potential issue here is that if nonculpable leaders
come to power primarily via a coup, they might be more vulnerable to coup threats as these
coup-born military regimes are less stable than other types of regimes (coup trap).10 Another
possibility is that state leaders’ efforts to coup-proof the regime might shape both battlefield
performances and the type of coups. For example, recruitment and promotion of elite officers
based on political loyalty rather than merit and competence would undermine the regime’s mil-
itary capabilities to fight rebels (e.g. Powell, 2015; Talmadge, 2013). At the same time, the
incompetence of the ruling coalition might mean that the regime will experience more coups
attempted by middle- and lower-ranked officers because the ruling elite cannot detect nor con-
tain such threats posed by the middle- and lower-ranked officers. I will address these potential
endogeneity issues when I test my theoretical implications in the empirical section and the
Appendix.
Data
My dataset consists of leader-month panels for the 311 wartime leaders who were in power dur-
ing a civil war in 79 countries between 1989 and 2015.11 Our unit of analysis is leader-month.
The leader-month observation is included in the analysis as long as there are at least 25 battle-
related deaths in the previous 12 months or in a calendar year as defined in the UCDP/PRIO
conflict dataset. I generate the leader list by using the Archigos version 4.1 (Goemans, Gled-
itsch and Chiozza, 2009) for democracies and the dataset used by Sudduth and Bell (2018)
for autocracies. To identify civil war, I use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.1-2016
(Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen, 2008). Crucially, the UCDP/PRIO
dataset does not distinguish conflict between the government and rebel groups (civil war) from
10Note, though, that a more recent research shows that leaders who come to power by over-
throwing the previous regime via a coup are significantly less likely to fall in such coup because
they can credibly demonstrate their strength to potential rivals (Sudduth and Bell, 2018).
11As I discuss subsequently, detailed information about the number of casualties, which is
my key independent variable, is only available from 1989 till 2015, and this defines my data
coverage.
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violent conflict between an incumbent leader and regime elites (coups). Following Bell and
Sudduth (2017), I exclude from the list of civil wars those dyads that are identified as coups by
Powell and Thyne (2011) and their updated dataset (Powell, 2018) to avoid any biases in the
results.12
Dependent Variable
I use the dataset on coups created by Powell and Thyne (2011) to identify wartime coup at-
tempts. The use of their dataset is appropriate for my study because it captures attempts to
forcefully overthrow an incumbent leader led not only by military officers but also by civilian
elites, as defined as “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state
apparatus to unseat the sitting executive” (Powell and Thyne, 2011, p12).13 For all the wartime
coup attempts, I have coded whether key plotters are members of an incumbent leader’s ruling
coalition by paying careful attention to whether they have access to the regime’s decision-
making body and political power. For this coding task, I consulted various sources, including
Keesing’s world news archives, Lexis-Nexis and case descriptions used by Aksoy, Carter and
Wright (2015). I then created two binary variables that measure when and who punishes a
leader. Outsider Coup is coded as one if a leader experiences a coup attempt carried out by
those outside the ruling coalition in that month and zero otherwise. Insider Coup identifies
whether a leader experiences a coup organized by members of the ruling coalition in that month
(1) or not (0).
The data include 22 insider coups and 20 outsider coups (see Table 1). The positions
of key plotters for insider coups include, for example, Defense Minister, Interior Minister,
Prime Minister, Vice President, and members of the ruling body of a military junta (e.g., Mali
July 1991, Chad April 1989, Sierra Leone January 1996, and Azerbaijan October 1994). Out-
sider coups are organized by middle or lower-ranked officers who have no direct access to the
12This results in 320 dyads included in my data.
13In addition, I consulted with other datasets, including Marshall and Marshall (2016), the
Archigos and GWF codebook, and included cases in the subsequent analyses where these
sources agree that coup attempts occurred. These are Bangladesh January 2007, Nepal Oc-
tober 2002 and Turkey June 1997.
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Table 1: Insider v.s. Outsider Coups
Democracy Military Regime Party Regime Personalist Total
Insider Coup 10 (45.5% ) 1 (4.5% ) 4 (18.2% ) 7 (31.8% ) 22 (100%)
Outsider Coup 8 (40 % ) 4 (20 % ) 2 (10 % ) 6 (30% ) 20 (100 % )
Note: I report the number and the percentage of each type of coup attempts
that occurred in the different regime types.
regime’s decision-making and political power (e.g., Mali March 2012, Sierra Leone April 1992
and Burundi April 2001). More detailed descriptions of plotters’ positions coded in my data
are available in the Appendix. As reported in Table 1, both types of coups occur in democracies
as well as in autocracies.14
There are several steps that require further discussion regarding the coding process. First,
testing Hypothesis 1 requires coding whether coups are led by individuals who are members of
the leader’s ruling coalition at the beginning of the war such that they would inherit culpability
should they replace the culpable leader (Prorok, 2016a), rather than at the event of punishment.
On this point, I checked and confirmed that plotters who were members of the leader’s ruling
coalition when they attempted a coup had also been members of the leader’s ruling coalition
at the war’s start in all of the cases in the data. Second, some civil wars are fought between
former military officers (rebels) and the regime. As we should not conflate these civil war cases
as coup attempts (e.g., Guinea-Bissau June 1998 or Chad April 2006), I follow Aksoy, Carter
and Wright (2015) and exclude from the list of coups these cases where none of the key plotters
are current members of the regime apparatus. Third, though the idea of different types of coup
agents introduced by Albrecht and Eibl (2018) is equivalent to what this article examines, their
dataset only covers North Africa and the Middle-East and does not match the list of coups
14Examples of outsider coups in democracies include Sierra Leone May 1997, Mali March
2012, and Papua New Guinea March 1990, and insider coups in democracies happened, for
example, in Mali July 1991, Burundi July 1996, and Philippines December 1989.
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coded by Powell and Thyne (2011). Note, though, that my coding decisions regarding Insider
Coup and Outsider Coup agree with their codings for all of the overlapping cases.
Independent Variables
My key independent variable is a leader’s war performance (i) when the leader is culpable for
a war, and (ii) when the leader is not culpable for a war. To properly code the variable, it is
important to keep in mind that a leader may face multiple ongoing conflicts simultaneously in
each month, and, crucially, the status of leader culpability for these conflicts might differ from
each other. That is, in each leader-month, it is possible that a leader is culpable for some of the
wars, as these started during his/her tenure, while s/he is not culpable for other conflicts, as s/he
came to power during these wars and has no political connections to the first leader. Because
of the existence of multiple wars with different culpability statuses for the same leader-month,
we can not simply make a binary variable that indicates whether a leader is culpable or not, and
then use the interaction terms between culpability and war performance variables.
I therefore create two variables – (i) War Performance for Culpable Conflict and (ii)
War Performance for Nonculpable Conflict – for each leader-month. The former measures
the war performance of dyads (i.e. two conflicting primary parties of the government and an
organized opposition/rebel group) in which a leader is culpable, and the latter captures the
war situation of dyads in which a leader is nonculpable. Following the literature (Prorok,
2016a, 29: Appendix), I use the number of battle deaths on the government side as an indicator
of battlefield performance.15 The battle deaths information is the most objective criterion to
evaluate the battlefield situation and directly capture the costs of war that internal audiences
suffer. An increase in this measure will increasingly make internal audiences consider culpable
leaders incompetent, while it will motivate nonculpable leaders to terminate the war by making
15Whether the government is winning or losing is another important aspect of war per-
formance that internal audiences might care about. To capture this aspect of war perfor-
mance, I calculated the monthly means of the number of government-side deaths relative to
the sum of government-side and rebel-side deaths observed in the previous 12 months (i.e.
government casualties
government casualties + rebel casualties). The results with this alternative measure of war performance are
shown in the Appendix and are consistent with the results in the main text.
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sufficient concessions to rebels, which might lead to a disagreement within the ruling coalition.
I calculate the monthly means of government-side battlefield deaths observed in the previous
12 months.16 They are logged to reduce the influence of outliers. The information on battle
deaths comes from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Version 5.0 (Sundberg and
Melander, 2013; Croicu and Sundberg, 2016). When there is no dyad where a leader is culpable
(or not culpable), these variables take a value of zero. Also, because we want to capture the
number of battle deaths that occurred during a leader’s tenure, the observations where the leader
has been in power less than 12 months are excluded from the analyses.
As to the coding of culpability, I build on the list of culpable leaders coded by Prorok
(2016a) and expand it up to 2015 by incorporating more recent information on dyads using
the more recent version of the UCDP data. First leaders are in power at the conflict’s start
and thus are considered responsible for the original decision to go to war. Even “non-initiator”
first leaders are considered culpable because they failed to prevent war. In identifying first
leaders, I follow Prorok (2016a, 77) and use the date of the first battle death as identified by
the UCDP dyadic dataset (Themner, 2016). Further, when the same dyad fights multiple times
(i.e., multiple episodes), I code culpability in the following way. If the previous episode ended
in a low-activity outcome with no clear terminating event such as the signing of a ceasefire or
military victory, the dyad’s original start date was used to code leader culpability. Meanwhile,
if a clear terminating event occurred in the previous episode, the start date of the new episode
was used to code culpability. To identify the manner of conflict termination, I used the UCDP
Conflict Termination Dataset v2.2015 (Kreutz, 2010, 2016).17
A replacement leader who has a political connection to the first leader of the dyad is
also coded as culpable. Culpability transfers if a replacement leader is a member of the first
leader’s ruling coalition such that s/he had access to the decision-making body of the regime at
the beginning of the war. Specifically, replacement leaders are coded as culpable if, at the war’s
start, they have key government positions such as cabinet memberships, or are members of the
16That is, Government casualties over the last 12 months
12
17For more detailed discussion on the coding, see the Appendix.
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ruling body of a military junta, members of the politburo or central committees of the ruling
party, family members (monarchy) or inner-circle members (personalist regimes) of the first
leader. In democracies, replacement leaders are culpable if they are members of the first leader’s
party, or have positions in the first leader’s cabinet at the war’s start (Croco, 2011; Prorok,
2016a). All other leaders who come to power during each dyad are coded as nonculpable.
The above coding criteria are consistent with the codings of outsider coup and insider coup
regarding how culpability transfers.
Control Variables
I include several control variables that might systematically impact each type of coup as well as
the independent variables. I control the logged monthly means of battlefield deaths sustained
by the opposition side in the previous 12 months (Rebel Casualty). This information comes
from UCDP GED Version 5.0 (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). Distance to Capital captures
the claim that wartime coups are more likely to occur when a war zone is closer to the state
capital (Bell and Sudduth, 2017), and measures the logged mean distance in kilometers between
the capital city and the ongoing war events observed in the previous 12 months. I obtained the
geographical information on war zones from UCDP GED Version 5.0. Rebel Fighting Capacity
captures a rebel group’s ability to “effectively engage the army militarily and win major battles,
posing a credible challenge to the government” (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009).
I include this variable as rebel fighting capacity might not only shape plotters’ willingness
to attempt a coup (Bell and Sudduth, 2017), but also influence government-side battlefield
deaths. It is measured on a 1-3 scale, with 1 indicating the Rebel Fighting Capacity is much
less than the government’s fighting capacity and 3 meaning that the rebel capacity is much
greater. I calculate the mean of rebel fighting capacity when a leader faces multiple rebels.
ln(Soldier Payment) is calculated as the log of the total military budget divided by the total
number of military personnel. I include this variable to address the possibility that levels of
military spending per soldier might shape the risk of coups led by combat officers as well as a
government’s war performance. The information comes from the Correlates of War capability
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(CINC) components, Version 3.02 (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972).
Negotiation captures the presence of peace negotiations between the government and
rebels. The information comes from the data on civil war negotiation coded originally by
Thomas (2014) and updated by Ryckman and Brathwaite. (2017). This is a binary variable and
is coded as one if a civil war state experiences formal bargaining where both the government
and a rebel are present at the meeting. Number of Rebels measures the number of opposition
groups each leader faces. ln(GDP/capita) measures an economic performance of each country
in the previous year. Data come from the Penn World Tables, version 9.0 (Feenstra and Tim-
mer, 2015). ln(Population) measures the logged size of population and the data are obtained
from the Correlates of War capability components, Version 3.02 (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey,
1972). Democracy is a binary variable to indicate whether a leader-month relates to a demo-
cratic political system. Military Regime indicates whether a leader-month is a military regime.
The information comes from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). Finally, I control the logged
number of how many months have passed since the last coup the country experienced (Months
Since Last Coup).
Results
Coup attempts during civil war are “rare events.” In my dataset, only 0.166 percent (20 obser-
vations) of all leader-months experience a coup led by coalition outsiders and 0.182 percent (22
observations) experience a coup led by coalition insiders. As maximum likelihood estimations
of logistic regression are known to be biased and to sharply underestimate the probability of
rare events as the number of events diminishes, I use the rare events logistic regression pro-
posed by King and Zeng (2001a,b). In Table 2, Models 1, 3, and 5 use Outsider Coup as the
dependent variable, while Models 2, 4, and 6 have Insider Coup as the dependent variable.
Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 use the entire sample, which includes wartime leader-month observations
as defined above. Models 5 and 6 use the sub-sample that includes leader-month observations
where formal negotiations between the government and rebels are present.
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Hypothesis 1 anticipates that a culpable leader with a poor war performance is more
likely to be punished by coalition outsiders. The results of Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 are consistent
with Hypothesis 1. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, as the number of government-side casualties
increases for conflicts for which a leader is culpable, the likelihood that the leader experiences
a coup carried out by coalition outsiders significantly increases (i.e., the coefficient for Gov-
ernment Casualty for Culpable Conflict is positive and significant in Model 1), while a change
in the government-side casualties for culpable conflict does not affect insider coup (i.e. the co-
efficient for Government Casualty for Culpable Conflict is not statistically significant in Model
2). The results hold when we control whether a negotiation between the government and rebels
is present (Models 3 and 4).
Hypothesis 2 expects that when a nonculpable leader performs poorly, s/he is more likely
to experience coups led by coalition insiders. As the costs of war increase, a nonculpable leader
becomes more willing to make sufficient and substantial concessions to rebels so that s/he can
terminate the costly war. This in turn increases the likelihood of conflict between the leader and
internal audiences over the exact nature of concessions and negotiation procedures. Hypothesis
2 thus more directly speaks to the circumstances where negotiations between the government
and rebels are present.18 Models 5 and 6 use the sample that includes observations with ongoing
negotiations. Specifically, I include all the leader-month observations where a peace negotiation
is present, but exclude observations that (i) have both culpable and nonculpable conflicts and
(ii) have a negotiation only for one type of conflict (i.e. a negotiation process is present only for
either culpable or nonculpable conflicts). The problem of including these cases in the analyses
is that we might count, for example, the cases of insider coups where the government has
performed poorly in nonculpable conflicts, but the insider coup happens in the context of peace
process for culpable conflicts, as evidence for Hypothesis 2.19
The results of rare event models with the sample of ongoing negotiation are provided
18But see the discussion below.
19Though, ideally, to test Hypothesis 2, I would use the sample that only includes observa-
tions where negotiations are present for nonculpable conflicts, the resulting number of obser-
vations is too small to make valid inferences.
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in Models 5 and 6 in Table 2. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, an increase in the number of
government-side casualties for conflicts for which a leader is not culpable significantly in-
creases the probability that the leader experiences a coup conducted by coalition insiders. The
coefficient for Government Casualty for Nonculpable Conflict is positive and significant in
Model 6. On the other hand, government-side casualties for nonculpable conflicts does not
impact outsider coups – i.e. the coefficient for Government Casualty for Nonculpable Conflict
is not statistically significant in Model 5. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2. I
should emphasize that what we need to evaluate in testing Hypothesis 2 is the effect of war per-
formance for nonculpable conflicts on leader punishment during negotiations, rather than the
effect of negotiations. Even after nonculpable leaders start negotiations with rebels, their will-
ingness to terminate the war by making substantial concessions should greatly differ, depending
on how costly it is to continue fighting a war. The war performance variable captures such vari-
ations in the costs that nonculpable leaders suffer by continuing to fight a war instead of ending
the war. It thus measures the variations in their willingness to make substantial concessions that
would satisfy the rebels, which in turn captures the possibility of conflict between nonculpable
leaders and internal audiences over the details of concessions and negotiation procedures.
The results of Models 5 and 6 are also consistent with Hypothesis 1. An increase in
the Government Casualty for Culpable Conflict will significantly increase the probability of
outsider coups, but does not affect the probability of insider coups. As I maintain in the theory
section, even when culpable leaders participate in peace processes with rebels, their strong
incentives to avoid compromise make it difficult for the negotiating parties to make progress.
In these situations, coalition outsiders want to replace the culpable leaders with someone who
could credibly commit to ending the costly war.
Table 3 presents the predicted probabilities and first differences of the two types of coups
when we change the number of government-side casualties from its 25th percentile to its 75th
percentile. I set all controls at the mean or median values. It demonstrates that when a leader
is culpable, a rise in the government-side casualties from its 25th percentile to 75th percentile
increases the probability of outsider coups by 53.57%. When a leader is not culpable for a war,
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Table 2: Rare-Events Logit Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Dependent variable:
Outsider Insider Outsider Insider Outsider Insider
Coup Coup Coup Coup Coup Coup
Independent Variable
Government Casualty for 0.233∗∗∗ 0.159 0.234∗∗ 0.173 0.370∗∗ 0.113
Culpable Conflict (H1) (0.089) (0.178) (0.096) (0.193) (0.172) (0.349)
Government Casualty for 0.157 0.372∗∗ 0.159 0.384∗∗ 0.219 0.668∗∗
Nonculpable Conflict (H2) (0.111) (0.171) (0.106) (0.169) (0.298) (0.336)
Controls
Rebel Casualty -0.004 0.077 -0.000 0.084 0.053 -0.434
(0.133) (0.212) (0.129) (0.212) (0.199) (0.313)
Distance to Capital 0.274 -0.118 0.280 -0.097 0.278 -0.811∗∗∗
(0.303) (0.194) (0.301) (0.195) (0.548) (0.274)
Rebel Fighting Capability -1.406∗∗ 1.136∗∗ -1.385∗∗ 1.152∗∗ -0.990 1.849
(0.660) (0.494) (0.649) (0.504) (1.919) (1.532)
Democracy 1.070 0.480 1.066 0.496 1.418 -0.746
(0.731) (0.725) (0.742) (0.740) (0.986) (1.190)
Military 0.165 -0.399 0.189 -0.343 0.009 -0.357
(0.658) (1.015) (0.629) (1.021) (1.571) (0.834)
Number of Rebels -0.107 -0.424 -0.095 -0.400 0.083 0.231
(0.160) (0.357) (0.170) (0.348) (0.660) (0.403)
ln(GDP/capita) -0.176 0.249 -0.183 0.204 0.007 0.903
(0.310) (0.364) (0.299) (0.397) (0.376) (0.921)
ln(Population) -0.640∗ -0.017 -0.646∗∗ -0.046 -0.968 0.159
(0.337) (0.233) (0.330) (0.231) (0.641) (0.351)
Soldier Payment -0.214 -0.299 -0.221 -0.284 -0.336 0.299
(0.271) (0.406) (0.283) (0.402) (0.775) (0.631)
Negotiation -0.090 -0.262
(0.543) (0.778)
ln(Months since Last Coup) -0.633∗∗∗ -0.206 -0.626∗∗∗ -0.197 -0.225 -0.395
(0.157) (0.194) (0.158) (0.193) (0.486) (0.487)
Constant 6.124∗∗ -5.028∗∗ 6.253∗∗ -4.678∗ 6.859 -12.034
(2.430) (2.446) (2.457) (2.788) (8.857) (9.526)
Sample Wartime Wartime Negotiation
N 6158 6158 6158 6158 1544 1544
Note: Standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses.
All the casualty variables are logged. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3: Predicted Probability and First Difference
Increase in Government Casualty for Culpable Conflict
25th 75th First Difference
Outsider Coup 0.0067 0.0103 0.0036** 53.57 %
Increase in Government Casualty for Nonculpable Conflict
25th 75th First Difference
Insider Coup 0.052 0.190 0.138** 263.30 %
Note: The predicted probabilities and first differences of each type of coups when changing
the number of government-side casualties from its 25th percentile to its 75th percentile are reported.
The probabilities and first differences are recalculated for leader-years, not leader-months,
as they are more standard units in the coup literature and are easier to evaluate.
The probabilities and first difference for outsider coups are estimated using Models 1, and
those for insider coups are calculated using Model 6 in Table 2.
an increase in the number of casualties from the 25th percentile to 75th percentile will increase
the probability of insider coups by 263 %. The magnitudes of these percentage increases show
that these differences are substantive and meaningful.
The results for the control variables also reveal the importance of distinguishing between
different types of coups. Some of the variables that the literature uses to explain the variation
in coups influence only either outsider coups or insider coups. For example, how recently a
country experienced a coup only affects outsider punishments, suggesting that coup-trap ar-
guments widely mentioned in the literature might only explain the patterns of coups executed
by lower-ranked officers during wartime. Similarly, a country’s population has a negative and
statistically significant effect on outsider coups, but not on insider coups. The findings demon-
strate that the literature’s claim that coups organized by different plotters involve fundamentally
different processes (Albrecht and Eibl, 2018) also applies to wartime coups.
24
Discussion and Robustness Tests
Several additional robustness tests provide further evidence for my hypotheses. Due to space
constraints, the results of these robustness checks are discussed here briefly and presented fully
in the supporting appendix.
First, the entry manner of leaders, rather than culpability, might explain the above em-
pirical tendencies. If nonculpable leaders come to power primarily via a coup, they might be
more vulnerable to coup threats. The manner of leader entry may affect both my key indepen-
dent variable (nonculpability) and a dependent variable (insider coup). To address this issue,
I show descriptive statistics of how nonculpable leaders come to power, and then run models
that control variations in leader entry manner. The descriptive statistics in the Appendix show
that most nonculpable leaders come to power in a non-coup manner. Thus the claim that a
coup trap mechanism is the key driving force behind my finding is not supported by the data.
Further, the results are robust to the inclusion of additional entry manner variables and support
my hypotheses.
Second, the results also hold when we control additional variables that might affect both
a government’s war performance and the type of coups. These include whether a regime is a
personalist dictatorship, the level of coup-proofing, ethnic exclusion, and military expenditure.
In the Appendix, I provide theoretical discussions on how these factors would affect both war
performances and the type of coups, and empirical results that control these factors.
Another point for discussion is the results on the punishment of nonculpable leaders
when negotiations are not present (Models 1, 2, 3, and 4). As the costs of war in terms of
battle deaths increase, nonculpable leaders will be increasingly inclined to end the war via
negotiated settlement (Prorok, 2016a). Thus, Government Casualty for Nonculpable Conflict
captures nonculpable leaders’ incentives to settle by making sufficient concessions, and identify
whether nonculpable leaders and their ruling coalition start discussing the details of negotiation
procedures and outcomes, where conflict between them over these issues could arise. In other
words, it can identify the political contexts where (a) the theoretical logics behind Hypothesis 2
expect leader punishment to happen, though (b) negotiations between governments and rebels
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are not present.20 Consistent with Hypothesis 2, as the costs of war increase and nonculpable
leaders pursue a negotiated settlement, they are more likely to face coups led by coalition
insiders (Models 2 and 4), but not by coalition outsiders (Models 1 and 3). These results thus
provide additional evidence for Hypothesis 2 and complement the results in Models 5 and 6.
Fourth, the results are consistent when we use the number of government-side casualties
relative to the sum of the government and rebel casualties as the war performance indicator.
The results are also robust to inclusion of additional controls, such as the duration of conflict
and leader tenure. Finally, the results hold when I use a sample of observations where at least
50 (rather than 25) battle-related deaths, or at least one battle-related death, are observed in the
previous 12 months. These additional results are provided in the Appendix.
Conclusion
To properly understand wartime accountability mechanisms, it is essential to disaggregate in-
ternal audiences into two groups – i.e., (i) individuals who are members of a political leaders’
ruling coalition with access to the decision-making body and political power, and (ii) those
outside the ruling coalition – as they have different cost-benefit calculations in punishing their
leaders. Because it shapes the leader’s wartime behavior and transfers only to those succes-
sors who are politically connected to culpable predecessors, leader culpability has important
implications for the types of internal audiences who have incentives to replace the leader.
This article’s findings have important implications for studies on war and political vio-
lence. First, by focusing on the question of who punishes leaders, this article sheds light on
20For instance, the December 1989 coup in the Philippines, where high-ranked officers who
were unhappy about nonculpable Aquino’s handling of the peace process and her conciliatory
approach toward the insurgencies attempted a coup, is excluded from the analyses of Models
5 and 6, because the formal negotiation between the government and the rebel had not taken
place yet. This case, however, is included in the analyses of Models 1, 2, 3 and 4, and the value
of Government Casualty for Nonculpable Conflict for the Aquino-December-1989 observation
is very high, capturing nonculpable Aquino’s strong incentives to settle and the possibility of
conflict within the government over the peace process. The value of Government Casualty
for Nonculpable Conflict for the Aquino-December-1989 observation is 4.865, three standard
deviations above the mean.
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how wartime leader changes affect the war trajectory. The findings that coalition outsiders are
more likely to punish culpable leaders when the war is going poorly suggest that there is a
self-sufficient mechanism within the regime to attempt to remove culpable leaders who have
incentives to gamble for resurrection and to terminate the war by putting nonculpable leaders
in power. This is certainly positive news given that shortening the war would save many lives
and resources. My findings also illuminate the causal mechanisms behind the literature’s find-
ing that successful coups during civil war shorten the duration of a civil war (Thyne, 2015).
Because coups that take place during a civil war tend to put nonculpable leaders in power who
have no incentives to keep fighting, the war is more likely to end quickly after the successful
coup.
At the same time, this article’s findings reveal that terminating war through a negotiation
process is not punishment-free for nonculpable leaders. Settling a war with rebels could lead
to disagreements among members of the ruling coalition over the details of concessions and
negotiation procedures. As coalition insiders with access to political power are sensitive to the
potential loss of their share of power in the post-war setting, they want to remove their leader
if s/he seems to have a different opinion about the negotiation process.
The promising next steps would be to investigate whether this article’s expectations about
leader culpability and punishment are applicable to (a) non-coup leader punishment, (b) leader
punishment in post-war phases rather than during ongoing wars, (c) the manner of rebel leader
punishment, and (d) leader punishment within the context of international wars. Finally, this
article contributes to the literature on coups by demonstrating the importance of distinguishing
different plotters and coding different types of plotters for all the wartime coups during the
period 1989-2015. Despite the clear and strong relationships between coups and civil wars,
the academic literatures on coups and civil wars have developed independently without much
consideration of the other. By accounting for the variation in the types of coups during civil
war, this paper contributes to the efforts to unite these literatures.
27
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni. 2010. “Persistence of Civil Wars.” Journal of
the European Economic Association 8(2).
Aksoy, Deniz, David B. Carter and Joseph Wright. 2015. “Terrorism and the Fate of Dictators.” World
Politics 67(3):423–468.
Albrecht, Holger and Ferdinand Eibl. 2018. “How to Keep Officers in the Barracks: Causes, Agents,
and Types of Military Coups.” International Studies Quarterly .
Beardsley, Kyle C. 2018. Third-Party Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. In Understanding War and Peace,
ed. Dan Reiter. understandingwarandpeace.com.
Bell, Curtis and Jun Koga Sudduth. 2017. “The Causes and Outcomes of Coup During Civil War.” The
Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(7):1432–1455.
Bruin, Erica De. 2019. “Will there be blood? Explaining violence during coups d’etat.” Journal of Peace
Research . Forthcoming.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow. 2003. The
Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Randolph M. Siverson. 1995. “War and the Survival of Political Leaders:
A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability.” American Political Science
Review 89(4):841–55.
Captain Strasser Is Ousted From Office. N.d. Focus on Sierra Leone. Forthcoming. Accessed: 2018-06-
20.
Chiozza, Giacomo and Hein E. Goemans. 2004. “International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is
War Still Ex Post Inefficient?” American Journal of Political Science 48(3):604–19.
Croco, Sarah E. 2011. “The Decider’s Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic
Punishment.” American Political Science Review 105(3):457–477.
Croco, Sarah E. and Jessica L. P. Weeks. 2016. “War Outcomes and Leader Tenure.” World Politics
68(4):577–607.
Croicu, Mihai and Ralph Sundberg. 2016. “UCDP GED Codebook.”. Department of Peace and Conflict
Research, Uppsala University.
Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan. 2009. “It Takes Two: A Dyadic
Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53:570–597.
Desch, Michael C. 1999. Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins university Press.
Feaver, Peter. 1999. “Civil-military relations.” Annual Review of Political Sciencew 2(1):211–241.
Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer. 2015. “The Next Generation of the Penn
World Table.” American Economic Review 105(10):3150–3182.
28
Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2014. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transi-
tions: A New Data Set.” Perspectives on Politics 12(2):313–31.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Håvard Strand.
2002. “Armed Conflict 1946U˝2001: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 39(5):615U˝637.
Goemans, Henk E. 2008. “Which Way Out? The Manner and Consequences of Losing Office.” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 52(6):771–794.
Goemans, Henk E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Giacomo Chiozza. 2009. “Introducing Archigos: A
Data Set of Political Leader, 1875-2003.” Journal of Peace Research 46(2):269–283.
Harbom, Lotta, Erik Melander and Peter Wallensteen. 2008. “Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict,
1946-2007.” Journal of Peace Research 45(5):697–710.
Harkness, Kristen A. 2018. When Soldiers Rebel: Ethnic Armies and Political Instability in Africa.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoddie. 2003. “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil
War Conflict Management.” American Journal of Political Science 47(2):318–332.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations. Cambrdige: Harvard University Press.
Joshi, Madhav, Erik Melander and Jason Michael Quinn. 2017. “Sequencing the Peace: How the Order
of Peace Agreemtn Implementation Can Reduce the Destabilizing Effects of Post-accord Elections.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(1):4–28.
King, Gary and Langche Zeng. 2001a. “Explaining Rare Events in International Relations.” Interna-
tional Organization 55(3):693–715.
King, Gary and Langche Zeng. 2001b. “Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data.” Political Analysis 9.
Krcmaric, Daniel. 2018. “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Leaders, Exile, and the Dilemmas of Interna-
tional Justice.” American Journal of Political Science 62(2):486–498.
Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termi-
nation Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 47(2):243–250.
Kreutz, Joakim. 2016. “UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset Codebook.”. Codebook.
Marshall, Monty G. and Donna Ramsey Marshall. 2016. “Coup D’etat Events, 1946-2015: Codebook.”
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2015.pdf. Center for Systemic Peace.
McMahon, R. Blake and Branislav L. Slantchev. 2015. “The guardianship dilemma: Regime security
through and from the Armed Forces.” American Political Science Review 109(2):297–313.
Mutwol, Julius. 2008. Peace Agreements and Civil Wars in Africa: Insurgent Motivations, State Re-
sponses, and Third-Party Peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone . Amherst, New York:
Cambria Press.
Powell, Jonathan. 2015. “Trading coups for civil wars.” African Security Review 23(4):329–338.
Powell, Jonathan. 2018. “Coups in the World, 1950 - Present.” http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/coup-
detat-dataset.html. Updated Coup Data.
29
Powell, Jonathan and Clayton Thyne. 2011. “Global Instances of Coups from 1950-2010: A New
Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 48(3).
Powell, Jonathan and Mwita Chacha. 2016. “Investing in stability: Economic interdependence, coups
d’etat, and the capitalist peace.” Journal of Peace Research 53(4):525–538.
Prorok, Alyssa K. 2016a. “Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes.” American Journal of Political
Science 60(1):70–84.
Prorok, Alyssa K. 2016b. “Led Asktray: Leaders and the Duration of Civil War.” Journal of Conflict
Resolution . Forthcoming
Roessler, Philip. 2016. Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa: The Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap.
Cabrdige, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Ryckman, Kirssa Cline and Jessica Maves Brathwaite. 2017. “Changing Horses in Midstream: Leader-
ship Changes and the Civil War Peace Process.” Conflict Management and Peace Science?. . Forth-
coming.
Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey. 1972. Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major
Power War, 1820-1965. In Peace, War, and Numbers, ed. Bruce Russett. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Sudduth, Jun Koga. 2016. Coup-Proofing and Civil War. In The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
Politics, ed. William R. Thompson. Oxford University Press.
Sudduth, Jun Koga and Curtis Bell. 2018. “The Rise Predicts the Fall: How the Method of Leader Entry
Affects the Method of Leader Removal in Dictatorships.” International Studies Quarterly 62(1):145–
159.
Sundberg, Ralph and Erik Melander. 2013. “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.”
Journal of Peace Research 50(4):523–532.
Svolik, Milan W. 2009. “Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes.” American
Journal of Political Science 53(2):477–494.
Svolik, Milan W. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Talmadge, Caitlin. 2013. “The puzzle of personalist performance: Iraqi Battlefield effectiveness in the
Iran-Iraq War.” Security Studies 22(2):180–221.
Themner, Lotta. 2016. “UCDP Dyadic Dataset Codebook Version 1-2016.”. Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP) and Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.
Thomas, Jakana. 2014. “Rewarding bad behavior: How governments respond to terrorism in civil war.”
American Journal of Political Science 58(4):804–818.
Thompson, William R. 1976. “Organizational Cohesion and Military Coup Outcomes.” Comparative
Political Studies 9(3):255–276.
Thyne, Clayton L. 2015. “The impact of coups d’etats on civil war duration.” Conflict Management and
Peace Science 34(3):287–307.
White, Peter B. 2019. “The Peril in Peace: Civil War Peace Agreements and Military Coups.” The
Journal of Politics p. Forthcoming.
30
Supporting Appendix forWho Punishes
the Leader?
Overview of Supporting Appendix
The supporting appendix to “Who Punishes the Leader?” includes more detailed information
on the data coding and operationalization, and a number of robustness checks and additional
results that I could not include in the main manuscript.
Specifically, I report :
1. how I coded the key dependent variables – insider coups and outsider coups,
2. how I operationalized and identified a first leader for each dyad, especially when the
same dyad fights multiple times (multiple episodes),
3. that the results are robust to inclusion of leader entry manner (i.e. regime-changing coup
entry) as additional controls,
4. that the results are consistent when I include additional control variables that might affect
both a country’s war performance and the type of coups,
5. that the results are robust to different indicators of war performance (i.e. government casualtygovernment casualty + rebel casualty )
as key independent variables,
6. that the results hold when I use a sample of leader-month observation where we observe
at least 50 battle-related deaths in the previous 12 months, and a sample of ongoing war
where we observe at least 1 battle-related deaths in the previous 12 months.
1
Supporting Appendix A: Coding of Insider Punishment and
Outsider Punishment
In this section, I list the cases of coup attempts with the information on key plotters’ positions.
The cases I coded as insider coups are shown in Table 1, and those coded as outsider coups
are reported in Table 2. As I mention in the main text, I have coded whether key plotters are
members of the leader’s ruling coalition by paying careful attention to whether they have access
to the regime’s decision-making body and political power. For this coding task, I have consulted
various sources including Keesing’s world news archives, Lexis-Nexis and case descriptions
used by Aksoy, Carter and Wright (2015). I confirmed that my coding decisions regarding
Insider Coup and Outsider Coup agree with the coding decisions by Albrecht and Eibl (2018)
for all of the cases that are covered by both datasets.
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Supporting Appendix B: Coding First Leader
Coding first leader requires precisely identifying conflict start dates. Following Prorok (2016,
77), I use the date of the first battle death (Startdate), not the date on which the conflict passed
the 25 battle deaths threshold (Stardate2), as identified by the UCDP dyadic dataset for this pur-
pose (Themner, 2016). While the first battle death date might still be an arbitrary threshold, as
violence may begin long before the first soldier or insurgent dies, choosing this cutoff provides
both an identifiable start date for which data is available and more closely approximates the true
start of fighting than does the 25 battle deaths date. Coding first leaders is not straightforward
when the same dyad fights multiple times. The first outbreak of fighting is straightforward to
code, as the first leader in the first episode of a conflict is clearly responsible. Coding leaders
in subsequent episodes of conflict, however, is less straightforward. If the outbreak of a new
episode of fighting within the same dyad is treated as a new war initiation, first leaders in sub-
sequent episodes should be coded as culpable. However, if a new outbreak of fighting simply
constitutes a continuation of an ongoing war, then first leaders in these subsequent episodes
may be considered non-culpable, depending upon their links to the first leader in the conflict
overall.
To address this issue, I follow the existing coding procedure made by Prorok (2016):
the dyad’s original start date, rather than the start date of a subsequent episode, was used to
code leader culpability, if the previous episode ended in a low activity outcome with no clear
terminating event such as the signing of a ceasefire, settlement, or military victory. If a clear
terminating event occurred in the previous episode, on the other hand, the start date of the new
episode was used to code culpability for leaders in that episode. A war is viewed as ongo-
ing if no clear end to the conflict is identifiable and low-level fighting has continued between
episodes. On the other hand, the first leader of a new episode would be seen as culpable if a
definitive termination of conflict occurred previously and the leader has thus presided over a
new outbreak of fighting. To identify the manner of conflict termination of each dyad-episode,
I used the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset v2.2015 (Kreutz, 2010, 2016).
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Supporting Appendix C: Leader Entry Manner and Coups
In this section, I show that the results are robust and support my hypotheses when I take into
account the manner of leader entry. As I discussed in the main text, a potential issue here is
that the entry manner of leaders, rather than the status of culpability of leaders, might explain
my empirical findings. As nonculpable leaders are defined as leaders who lack political con-
nections with the first leaders, they might come to power primarily by forcefully ousting the
previous leader and regime via a coup, rather than coming to power peacefully. The issue here
is that a new coup-born leader might be more vulnerable to coup threats coming from his own
ruling coalition as these coup-born military regimes are less stable than other types of regimes.
If nonculpable leaders tend to come to power by regime-changing coups and the “coup trap”
dynamic is at work, omitting leader entry manner variables would lead to biases in our re-
sults, as the entry manner may affect both my key independent variable (nonculpability) and a
dependent variable (insider coup).
To fully explore and address this issue, in this section, I will first describe how nonculpa-
ble leaders come to power and discuss the findings. I will then show that the statistical results
are robust and support my hypotheses when I control the entry manner of leaders. First, in Table
3, I describe the entry manner of wartime leaders. In coding the entry manner, I use Sudduth
and Bell (2018) for autocracies and Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009) for democracies.
As discussed above, nonculpable leaders, by definition, have no political connections with the
first leaders. Thus, nonculpable leaders might come to power primarily via regime-change
coups – i.e. coups that overthrow the entire regime and replace the group of ruling elites who
have the capacity to control policy choices with another group of elites (Aksoy, Carter and
Wright, 2015)–.1
Table 3, however, reveals that the majority of nonculpable leaders (91 percent) come to
1Note that if a coup just replaces an incumbent leader while preserving the regime and the power of the
incumbent ruling coalition (i.e. a leader-reshuffling coup), the new coup-born leader is also a member of the same
ruling coalition and thus has political connections to the former leader and his/her decision making (Aksoy, Carter
and Wright, 2015). As we are interested in how nonculpable leaders who have no connections to the previous
leader come to power, we have to differentiate a regime-changing coup entry manner from a leader-reshuffling
coup entry manner.
6
Table 3: Entry Manner of Leaders
Entry Manner Nonculpable Leaders Culpable Leaders
Leader-Reshuffling Coup 2(1.38% ) 2 (1.53 %)
Regime-Change Coup 11 (7.06% ) 13 (9.92 % )
Other Irregular Entry 29 (20.0% ) 29 (22.1 % )
Regular Entry 103 (71.0% ) 87 (66.4 % )
Total 145 (100.0 % ) 131 (100.0 % )
Note: I report the number and the percentage of entry manner for nonculpable leaders and culpable leaders.
power in a noncoup manner.2 70 percent of nonculpable leaders come to power in a regu-
lar manner (i.e. “according to the prevailing rules, provisions, conventions, and norms of the
country” (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza, 2009, 272)). The examples include the Philip-
pines’ Aquino and Peru’s Fujimori. The number of nonculpable leaders who came to power
via a regime-changing coup is 11 (or 7.06 percent) and is even lower than the number of culpa-
ble leaders who enter in a regime-changing coup manner (13 leaders and 9.92 percent). When
we look at the number of leader-reshuffling coups – i.e. coups that replace an incumbent leader
while preserving the regime and the power of the incumbent ruling coalition (Aksoy, Carter and
Wright, 2015)–, the number is much smaller. Only two nonculpable leaders (or 1.38 percent)
came to power via leader-reshuffling coups.
In sum, the majority of nonculpable leaders enter in a noncoup manner, and there is no
2As discussed in the main text, leaders might have multiple civil wars during their tenure as well as multiple
wars with different culpability statuses in the same month. Given this complexity, in Table 3, I focus on lead-
ers who have civil wars in which they are nonculpable, but do not simultaneously face wars in which they are
culpable at some point during their tenure as nonculpable leaders. Similarly, in specifying culpable leaders, I
focus on leaders who have wars in which they are culpable, but do not simultaneously face wars in which they are
nonculpable at some point during their tenure.
7
systematic difference between culpable leaders and nonculpable leaders in terms of how they
come to power. Table 3 therefore suggests that the way nonculpable leaders come to power
does not have a decisive impact on how nonculpable leaders experience insider coups.
To take into account the above-mentioned point in a more systematic way, I now run
models by controlling different manners of leader entry in Table 4. I control whether a leader
comes to power via regime-change coup, or regular manner, and have the Other Irregular
Entry variable as an excluded base category.3 In this way, we can avoid a potential issue where
omitted “entry manner” variables explain both my key independent variable (nonculpability)
and the dependent variable (insider coups). As you can see in Table 4, all the results are robust
to the inclusion of additional controls and support my hypotheses.4
3Note that the number of leader-reshuffling coup is too small to be included as a separate control variable. It
thus is treated as an excluded category in the models in Table 4.
4Interestingly, the results in Table 4 show that whether leaders come to power via a regime-changing coup does
not have a significant effect on whether they suffer from either insider coups or outsider coups. On the other hand,
leaders who come to power in a regular manner are more likely to face outsider coups (Model 1) than leaders
who come to power via other irregular manner (i.e. the base category). This is consistent with the literature’s
finding that leaders who come to power by a regime-changing coup are significantly less likely to fall in another
regime-changing coup than leaders who come to power via a regular manner (Sudduth and Bell, 2018).
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Supporting Appendix D: Potential Endogeneity Issues
In this section, I pay careful attention to factors that might affect both a country’s war per-
formance and the type of coup which a state leader would experience during wartime. These
variables include Personalist Regime, Counterbalancing, Ethnic Exclusion, Military Expen-
diture, Military Expenditure/GDP, and Soldier Payment. To avoid potential omitted variable
biases, I control these variables and provide the results in Tables 5 and 6. The results in Tables
5 and 6 are consistent with those reported in the main text and support my hypotheses.
I here provide a brief discussion on how each of these factors might affect both battle-
field performances and the type of coups. First, I control Personalist Regime. In personalist
regimes, dictators have successfully eliminated strong rival elites over time so that the ruling
elite is no longer able to hold the dictators accountable (Geddes, 1999). In this process, dic-
tators have weakened the ruling coalition’s power and capability by replacing competent and
strong elites with individuals who are more loyal to and uncritical of the dictators (e.g. Sud-
duth, 2017b). Given the loyalty-competence tradeoff within personalist regimes, I expect that
personalist regimes would have poor military performance (e.g. Talmadge, 2013). At the same
time, the weakness and incompetence of the ruling coalition might mean that the regime would
experience more coups executed by middle- and lower-ranked officers, because the ruling elite
is not competent enough to catch and contain the movement against them coming from the
middle- and lower-ranked officers. Moreover, as the use of private goods (e.g. the distribution
of material resources) is a dominant way for personalist leaders to maintain the support from
members of the ruling coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), coalition outsiders might
have higher levels of grievances against their leaders and the ruling coalition. The information
on the Personalist variable comes from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014).
Second and relatedly, the literature argues that some state leaders utilize coup-proofing
tactics in order to reduce the risk of coups they face, yet these coup-proofing tactics would
reduce a regime’s military effectiveness. Militaries in coup-proofed regimes perform poorly
in counterinsurgency operations as the leaders’ tactics that divide the armed forces and forbid
10
inter-branch communications create coordination challenges in military operations (Powell,
2015). At the same time, a recent research shows that counterbalancing tactics that intend
to reduce coup risk by preventing any one part of the military from controlling too many re-
sources have reductive effects only on elite-officer coups, but not on coups led by middle- or
lower-ranked officers (Albrecht and Eibl, 2018). This might thus imply that coalition insid-
ers’ capabilities relative to that of coalition outsiders would diminish as the levels of coup-
proofing increase. Coups executed by coalition outsiders then should be more likely to happen
in the coup-proofed regimes. To capture this idea, I include the Counterbalancing variable.
Counterbalancing involves “the creation of additional military branches that prevent any one
part of the military from controlling too many resources, for example, creating several distinct
armies (Belkin and Schofer, 2003, 613)”. The information on this variable comes from Sudduth
(2017a).
Third, some leaders carry out coup-proofing tactics along ethnic lines. Such ethnic ex-
clusion or ethnic stacking might compromise the regime’s counterinsurgency capabilities and
increases the risk of outsider coups. Some state leaders employ the practice of recruiting and
promoting members of certain ethnic groups that are seen as more loyal and excluding eth-
nic groups that are potentially disloyal (Harkness, 2016; Morency-Laflamme and McLauchlin,
2019). The tactics of ethnic exclusion might worsen the regimes’ positions vis-a-vis rebel
groups and undermine the regime’s counterinsurgency capabilities, because the excluded eth-
nic groups are more likely to join rebels and can leverage their insider knowledge (Roessler,
2011). At the same time, directing more resources to certain ethnic groups and excluding other
groups would create grievances of the purged groups and increase the risk of outsider coups.
To capture this idea and address a potential omitted variable bias, I follow Roessler (2011) and
create the Ethnic Exclusion variable. Ethnic Exclusion captures the relative number of excluded
ethnic groups calculated as a share of the total number of ethnic groups in each country. I use
the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data (Vogt and Girardin., 2015) that provides annual data on
politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to executive-level state power. For each eth-
nic group, I consider whether members of the group are excluded from the executive-level state
11
power, or included. Following Roessler (2011), I code a particular ethnic group being excluded
if the EPR data codes its status as Discriminated or Powerless, while I code the group being
included if the EPR data codes its status as Dominant, Monopoly, Senior Partner, or Junior
Partner. I then count the number of excluded ethnic groups for each country-year and divide it
by the total number of ethnic groups.
Fourth, military expenditures would affect a country’s war performance as well as offi-
cers’ incentives to attempt a coup. In particular, the size of the military budget would affect
whether coalition insiders (i.e. high-ranking military officers) would launch a coup as the mil-
itary budget is an instrument for elite officers to maintain their bargaining power within the
regime (Albrecht and Eibl, 2018, e.g.). Military Expenditure measures the log of the total mil-
itary budget. Military Expenditure/GDP is the size of military budget measured as a share of
gross domestic product (GDP). The information comes from the Correlates of War capability
(CINC) components, Version 3.02 (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972).
Finally, as in the main text, I include Soldier Payment, calculated as the log of the total
military budget divided by the total number of military personnel. This variable captures the
idea that levels of military spending per soldier would shape coups led by middle- and lower-
ranked officers as well as a government’s war performance. As these lower-ranked officers see
military service as “a job that provides them with a regular income (Albrecht and Eibl, 2018,
316)”, they have higher grievances against the government when their salaries are low. Their
incentives and capabilities to effectively fight on the battlefield also depend on whether they
obtain decent salaries and military equipment. The information comes from the Correlates of
War capability (CINC) components, Version 3.02 (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972).
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Supporting Appendix E: Results with Different Independent
Variables
In Tables 7, I test my hypotheses using alternative war performance indicators. The variables
Government v.s. Rebel Casualty for Culpable Conflict and Government v.s. Rebel Casualty
for Nonculpable Conflict capture whether the government is winning or losing in each type of
dyads. I use these alternative indicators for war performance, because in the context of Hy-
pothesis 1, coalition outsiders such as middle- and low-ranked soldiers might care more about
whether they are winning or losing, rather than the costs of war in terms of government-side
casualties. Specifically, I use the monthly means of the size of government-side deaths relative
to the sum of government-side and rebel-side deaths observed in the previous 12 months (i.e.
government casualty
government casualty + rebel casualty ). An increase in this variable means that the government is losing rel-
ative to rebels. Total Casualty is calculated as the monthly means of the total battlefield deaths
(both sides) observed in the previous 12 months and it is logged to reduce the influence of
outliers. Though the results are weaker than those reported in the main text, they are consistent
with my hypotheses.
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Supporting Appendix F: Results Using Different Criteria of Ongoing Civil
War
Tables 8 shows that the results hold when I use a sample of leader-month observation where at
least 50 battle-related deaths occurred in the previous 12 months (Models 1, 2, 3 and 4), or at
least 1 battle-related deaths occurred in the previous 12 months (Models 5, 6, 7 and 8).
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